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UTokyo-Cambridge Voices: East Asia at Risk: Regional Insecurity and the Future of Alliances - Shared screen with speaker view
Brad Glosserman
I am perplexed: During the time of the “hard line” that the Japanese prefer, Beijing has crushed HK, done horrific things to Xinjiang, expanded island building in the SCS, set records for daily presence in the Senkakus and helped raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait to new levels. This is considered a successful policy? Also, i am hearing in Tokyo concern that a US policy that calls for consultation and multilateral action actually reduces Tokyo’s room for maneuver by forcing it to go along with the harder US line. This is not to challenge Fujiwara-sensei’s argument so much as to challenge the logic of Japan and any hope that Tokyo policy makers will ever be content
Nobuyasu Abe
Nobuyasu Abe @Tokyo I don't share the skecpticism of the Japanese foreign ministry establishment. Trump was only theatrically tough against China but did not really gain much from China. Bob Zoellick wrote a good article. Trump would have been very likely outsmarted by China. Democratic administration with a rich source of academics and professionals will be a lot tougher to China because they are harder to be easily tricked.
Nobue Nachi
Please write your comments/questions in the Q&A box, not in the chat box. Thank you.
Nobue Nachi
Please write your comments/questions in the Q&A box, not in the chat box. Thank you.
Masahiro Taniguchi. Question to Dr. Wright and Prof. Fujiwara:What are the important points/conditions for the Japan-US alliance to sustainably function in general as well as under the new administrations of both countries a you mentioned the host nation support negotiation earlier?How can and should we think and measure the “reciprocity” of the alliance relationship given the asymmetries between two countries in threat perception, military capability, strategy, national power as such asymmetries are very usually for any alliance?